Logical Fallacies And You!

the word "fallacy" can be a bit vague and ambigous, frequently it is used to mean "common factual error", logical fallacy is a bit different, it shares the meaning in it being a error, but rather than a specific factual error it's more a common error in reasoning.

further ambiguity is conveyed through "type" and "reason", I'll slap on a quotation here for this:

So, again

A loaded question is a question with a false, disputed, or question-begging presupposition.
Ex.

Loaded questions are chock full of false or questionable presuppositions(see:ASSUMPTIONS).

The question "Have you stopped beating your wife?" presupposes that you have beaten your wife prior to its asking, as well as that you have a wife. If you are unmarried, or have never beaten your wife, then the question is loaded.

I was going to go with the whole wife beating one but I'd rather go with one that I heard quite frequently growing up.

"Does your Mom know that you are gay? Yes or No?"
Answering both yes and no makes you "gay" in the context of that conversation.
Makes me wonder at what point I correlated the word gay with homosexual and past that when negativity was associated with the word.

1.Sometimes it is reasonable to argue from a lack of evidence for a proposition to the falsity of that proposition, when there is a presumption that the proposition is false. For instance, in American criminal law there is a presumption of innocence, which means that the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and if the prosecution fails to provide evidence of guilt then the jury must conclude that the defendant is innocent.

Similarly, the burden of proof is usually on a person making a new or improbable claim, and the presumption may be that such a claim is false. For instance, suppose that someone claims that the president was taken by flying saucer to another planet, but when challenged can supply no evidence of this unusual trip. It would not be an Appeal to Ignorance for you to reason that, since there is no evidence that the president visited another planet, therefore he probably didn't do so.
2.We sometimes have meta-knowledge—that is, knowledge about knowledge—which can justify inferring a conclusion based upon a lack of evidence. For instance, schedules—such as those for buses, trains, and airplanes—list times and locations of arrivals and departures. Such schedules usually do not attempt to list the times and locations when vehicles do not arrive or depart, since this would be highly inefficient. Instead, there is an implicit, understood assumption that such a schedule is complete, that all available vehicle departures and arrivals have been listed. Thus, we can reason using the following sort of enthymeme:

There is no departure/arrival listed in schedule S for location L at time T.
Suppressed Premiss: All departures and arrivals are listed in schedule S.
Therefore, there is no departure/arrival for location L at time T.

This kind of completeness of information assumption is often called the "closed world assumption". When it is reasonable to accept this assumption—as with plane or bus schedules—it is not a fallacy of appeal to ignorance to reason this way.
3.Another type of reasoning is called "auto-epistemic" ("self-knowing") because it involves reasoning from premisses about what one knows and what one would know if something were true. The form of such reasoning is:

If p were true, then I would know that p.
I don't know that p.
Therefore, p is false.

For instance, one might reason:

If I were adopted, then I would know about it by now.
I don't know that I'm adopted.
Therefore, I wasn't adopted.

Similarly, when extensive investigation has been undertaken, it is often reasonable to infer that something is false based upon a lack of positive evidence for it. For instance, if a drug has been subjected to lengthy testing for harmful effects and none has been discovered, it is then reasonable to conclude that it is safe. Another example is:

If there really were a large and unusual type of animal in Loch Ness, then we would have undeniable evidence of it by now.
We don't have undeniable evidence of a large, unfamiliar animal in Loch Ness.
Therefore, there is no such animal.

As with reasoning using the closed world assumption, auto-epistemic reasoning does not commit the fallacy of Argument from Ignorance.

To cast abortion as a solely private moral question,…is to lose touch with common sense: How human beings treat one another is practically the definition of a public moral matter. Of course, there are many private aspects of human relations, but the question whether one human being should be allowed fatally to harm another is not one of them. Abortion is an inescapably public matter.

Suppose, for instance, that we argue that a number of propositions, p1, p2,…, pn are equivalent by arguing as follows (where "p => q" means that p implies q):

p1 => p2 => … => pn => p1

Then we have clearly argued in a circle, but this is a standard form of argument in mathematics to show that a set of propositions are all equivalent to each other. So, when is it fallacious to argue in a circle?

For an argument to have any epistemological or dialectical force, it must start from premisses already known or believed by its audience, and proceed to a conclusion not known or believed. This, of course, rules out the worst cases of Begging the Question, when the conclusion is the very same proposition as the premiss, since one cannot both believe and not believe the same thing. A viciously circular argument is one with a conclusion based ultimately upon that conclusion itself, and such arguments can never advance our knowledge.

Usually, the truth-value of premisses is not a question for logic, but for other sciences, or common sense. So, while an argument with a false premiss is unsound, it is usually not considered fallacious. However, when a disjunctive premiss is false for specifically logical reasons, or when the support for it is based upon a fallacy, then the argument commits the Black-or-White Fallacy.

One such logical error is confusing contrary with contradictory propositions: of two contradictory propositions, exactly one will be true; but of two contrary propositions, at most one will be true, but both may be false. For example:
Contradictories
It's hot today. It's not hot today.
Contraries
It's hot today. It's cold today.